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Game Theory >> Content Detail



Syllabus



Syllabus



Description


This course is a rigorous investigation of the evolutionary and epistemic foundations of solution concepts, such as rationalizability and Nash equilibrium. It covers classical topics, such as repeated games, bargaining, and supermodular games as well as new topics such as global games, heterogeneous priors, psychological games, and games without expected utility maximization. Applications are provided when available.



Textbooks


Readings are listed by session in the readings section of this course.

Amazon logo Osborne, and Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994. ISBN: 0262650401. (Primary)

Amazon logo Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991. ISBN: 0262061414. (Primary)

Amazon logo Kreps, David M. Notes on the Theory of Choice. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988. ISBN: 0813375533.

Amazon logo Weibull, Jörgen W. Evolutionary Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995. ISBN: 0262231816. (Supplementary)

Amazon logo Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine. The Theory of Learning in Games. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998. ISBN: 0262061945.



Supplementary Readings


The supplementary readings in this course are drawn from the following journals.

Articles in Games and Economic Behavior 5 (1993).

Articles in Journal of Economic Theory 59 (1993).

Articles before 1997 in Econometrica, Review of Economic Studies or Quarterly Journal of Economics.



Grading



activitiespercentages
Four Problem Sets40%
Take-home Final Exam60%

 








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