Courses:

Advanced Contract Theory >> Content Detail



Syllabus



Syllabus

A list of topics covered in this course is available in the calendar below.



Prerequisites


Microeconomic Theory I (14.121), Contract Economics (14.281), or permission of instructors.



Requirements (Overview)


  • Complete 4 homework assignments
  • Make a 25-minute presentation
  • No exams, no paper required. Students are encouraged to start, write, and present their papers.


Textboook


The primary book for this course is:

Bolton, Patrick, and Mathias Dewatripont. Contract Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005. ISBN: 9780262025768.

Please see readings for more information.



Assignments


There are 4 homework assignments. You will have at least two weeks to complete each one. (Some) will have a problem: to ask a question and provide an answer.



Presentation


Paper is chosen by the student or suggested by the professor. Own relevant papers are allowed. Style: 25-minutes conference presentation. Includes: motivation, contribution, main points, and critical analysis. Also, would require written short report briefly outlining contribution of the paper and of related papers. In case, two or more related papers are presented by several students, one report from the group will suffice.

Students are also required to discuss the paper (and presentation) of at least one other student. (Since the presentations are made two per class, naturally presenters provide comments on each other). It is important to have these discussions as it engages at least two students on the same project.



Recommended Citation


For any use or distribution of these materials, please cite as follows:

Sergei Izmalkov, course materials for 14.129 Advanced Contract Theory, Spring 2005. MIT OpenCourseWare (http://ocw.mit.edu/), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Downloaded on [DD Month YYYY].



Calendar


Lec #topics
Games with Incomplete Information
1Bayesian-Nash games
Auctions and Mechanism Design
2Auctions I: Common auctions, revenue equivalence, and optimal mechanisms
3Auctions II: Independent private values (IPV) and revenue equivalence
4

Auctions III: Interdependent values and linkage principle

Auctions IV: Multiunit auctions and Cremer-McLean mechanism

Static Models
5Simple models: Hidden information, Spence's model, and hidden action
6Moral hazard: Multiple agents
Dynamic Models
7Dynamic adverse selection: DG monopoly with fixed types
8Dynamic moral hazard
Surplus Division
9Surplus division, fair distribution, the Shapley value, and Nash bargaining solution

 








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